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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 11, Number 3, Spring 1973
Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It
and Those Who Don't
David E. Seidelson*
In Abendschein v. Farrell,' the Supreme Court of Michigan declined
to embrace the "heady stuff' 2 of interest analysis and decided instead
to retain lex loci delicti as the method of resolving choice-of-law prob-
lems in tort cases. While my own inclination is toward interest analy-
sis, rather obviously the highest appellate court of any state has the
right and the capacity to utilize any constitutionally permissible tech-
nique to resolve conflicts problems, and to hell with my personal pref-
erence. Still, the result achieved by the court in Abendschein has
continued to trouble me. I think now I know why, and, in the process
of figuring out why, I think I may have arrived at some conclusions
which may be of assistance to courts working with the complexities of
interest analysis and of value to those courts which have elected to re-
tain lex loci delicti. First, the facts of A bendschein.
Three domiciliaries of New York were passengers and a domiciliary
of Michigan the driver in an automobile trip which began in Buffalo
and was intended to end in Detroit. The car was owned (and ap-
parently leased to the driver) by a Michigan-based corporation. In
Ontario the car "rolled over several times"3 because, according to the
complaint, the driver was operating it "at speeds of 90 miles per hour
around curves while intoxicated."4 One of the passengers died and the
other two were injured. The two survivors and the personal representa-
tive of the decedent sued the driver and the owner in Michigan. De-
. Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
2. Id. at 519, 170 N.W.2d at 140.
3. Id. at 514, 170 N.W.2d at 138.
4. Id.
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fendants asserted the applicability of the Ontario guest statute which
existed at the time of the operative facts and which precluded recovery
by passengers irrespective of the degree of culpability of the host-
driver. 5 New York had no guest statute. Michigan had a guest statute
which permitted passenger recovery for the "gross negligence or wilful
and wanton misconduct"6 of host-driver. Plaintiffs asserted the ap-
plicability of the dispositive law7 of either New York or Michigan. Lex
loci delicti inexorably led the Supreme Court of Michigan to the con-
clusion that the Ontario guest statute barred the action and, therefore,
defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted. And that's
the result which has troubled me.
With the reader's indulgence, I'd like to undertake an admittedly
circuitous route which ultimately will lead us back to Abendschein
and what I think is wrong with its conclusion.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, unlike the Michigan court, has
adopted interest analysis. In Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.,8 the New
Jersey court was confronted with these facts: Plaintiff, a Connecticut
domiciliary, and defendant, a New Jersey domiciliary, were students at
Parsons College, Iowa. Defendant's father "owned"9 Trent Aluminum
Company and permitted his son to drive to Parsons a car registered
and insured in New Jersey and owned by the close corporation. Plain-
tiff and defendant planned to drive from Parsons to Columbia, Mis-
souri. En route, the car, operated by defendant, collided with another
vehicle operated and occupied by Iowa domiciliaries. The claims of
those Iowa residents were settled by the corporation's liability carrier.
To recover for his injuries, plaintiff-passenger sued defendant-host and
the corporate owner in New Jersey. Defendants pleaded the Iowa guest
5. ONT. Rav. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960). Subsequently, the Ontario statute was
amended to provide that:
T]he owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the
usiness of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or
damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried
in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle, ex-
cept where such loss or damage was caused or contributed to by the gross negligence
of the driver of the motor vehicle.
ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 202, § 132(3) (1966).
6. MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, ch. 75b, § 9.2101 (1968).
7. The phrase "dispositive law" describes "those rules which are used to determine
the nature of rights arising from a fact-group, i.e., those which dispose of a claim."
Taintor, Foreign Judgment in Rem: Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in Personam,
8 U. PrTr. L. REv. 223, 233 n.58 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Taintor]. It is my feeling that
"dispositive law" is more accurate and useful than such phrases as "municipal law,"
"internal law," or "local law."
8. 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970).
9. Id. at 514, 263 A.2d at 130.
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statute,' which holds the host immune from liability unless he was
intoxicated or reckless. The New Jersey court began the process of in-
terest analysis by noting: "In order to determine whether the Iowa
guest statute should apply to this case, we must first examine its pur-
poses as articulated by the Iowa courts."" Just so. Examination of Iowa
decisions led the court to conclude that the reasons underlying the
Iowa guest statute were:
(1) "to cut down litigation arising from the commendable un-
selfish practice of sharing with others transportation in one's
vehicle and protect the Good Samaritan from claims based on
negligence by those invited to ride as a courtesy,"
(2) "to prevent ingratitude by guests,"
(3) "to prevent suits by hitchhikers," and
(4) "to prevent collusion suits by friends and relatives resulting
in excessively high insurance rates."'12
The court then determined that none of those reasons was convertible
into a legitimate interest on the part of Iowa in having its guest statute
applied. One might have thought that that determination would have
disposed of the guest-statute defense, but such a one would have been
mistaken. The court saw fit to buttress its opinion that the Iowa guest
statute was inapplicable by looking to the dispositive laws of New
Jersey, defendant driver's domicile, and Connecticut, plaintiff passen-
ger's domicile, neither of which contained a guest statute. The absence
of a guest statute in New Jersey combined with defendant driver's New
Jersey domicile led the court to state
It may well be that in this case . . . New Jersey has an interest.
We are not certain that a defendant's domicile lacks an interest
in seeing that its domiciliaries are held to the full measure of
damages or the standard of care which that state's laws provide
for. A state should not only be concerned with the protection and
self-interest of its citizens.'2
The absence of a guest statute in Connecticut and the plaintiff's Con-
necticut domicile led the court to determine that Connecticut, too, had
10. IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 321, § 321.494 (1966). The statute has since been amended to
provide for liability if the host was:
... under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, a narcotic, hypnotic, or other drug,
or any combination of such substances, or . . . reckless . . . .
IOWA CoDE ANN. ch. 321, § 321.494 (Supp. 1973).
11. 55 N.J. at 516, 263 A.2d at 131.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 524, 263 A.2d at 136.
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"a significant interest in having [its] law applied to this case."14 Since
the dispositive laws of Connecticut and New Jersey were the same, the
court concluded: "[T]his case presents a false conflict and it is unneces-
sary for us to decide whether this state [New Jersey] has an interest
sufficient to warrant application of its law."'15
Having found Connecticut's dispositive law relevant to the choice-
of-law problem, the New Jersey court apparently felt obligated to
consider (before rejecting) defendants' suggestion that the court should
take cognizance of Connecticut's indicative law,' 6 lex loci delicti. De-
fendants argued that, if the operative facts were laid before a Connec-
ticut court, that court would impose the Iowa guest statute even to the
economic jeopardy of its own domiciliary. That led defendants to
assert a diminished interest on the part of Connecticut in having the
Connecticut plaintiff recover from the New Jersey defendants. The
court rejected the assertion because (1) that's renvoi and likely to re-
sult in a never-ending circle, and (2) Connecticut's lex loci delicti in-
dicative law did not reflect Connecticut's view of its interest in conflicts
cases. So the guest statute was held inapplicable.
I have no serious quarrel with that ultimate conclusion. The
methods employed in achieving it, however, do trouble me. Since the
court was required to decide only the applicability of the Iowa guest
statute, once it determined that the reasons for that guest statute were
not convertible into legitimate interests on the part of Iowa in the case
before the court, the choice-of-law problem was resolved. The sole re-
maining reason for looking to the dispositive laws of New Jersey and
Connecticut would have been to secure assurance that neither of those
states had a guest statute which defendants had inadvertently failed to
plead. But the court, sua sponte, utilized New Jersey's dispositive law
as the source of a tentative interest on the part of New Jersey in having
the New Jersey defendants held liable for simple negligence, and, in
response to defendants' argument, declined to recognize Connecticut's
indicative law as diminishing that state's interest. It seems to me, as is
often the case when a court undertakes needless effort, the court's
reaction to New Jersey's dispositive law and Connecticut's indicative
14. Id. at 525, 263 A.2d at 136.
15. Id.
16. The phrase "indicative law" is intended to refer to "those rules which indicate
the system of dispositive rules which is to be applied." Taintor, supra note 7. It is my
lbelief that "indicative law" is simpler and no less descriptive than such phrases as "conflict-
-of-laws laws" or "conflict-of-laws rules." I am indebted to the late Dean Taintor for cre-
:ation of the phrases "indicative law" and "dispositive law."
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law may not have been entirely appropriate. Since both reactions are a
part of the court's opinion, and therefore available for precedential
use, the potential impropriety should be examined and elaborated on
so that the reader can determine whether or not those reactions deserve
precedential effect.
Perhaps the most feasible way to do that is to create a situation in
which the potential interests of New Jersey and Connecticut would
have relevance. That can be accomplished simply by determining that
Iowa did have a legitimate interest in having its guest statute applied.
And that, in turn, can be effected by disagreeing with one conclusion
of the New Jersey court. The court found that one of the reasons for the
Iowa guest statute was to protect the Good Samaritan host from the
ingratitude of the guest. As viewed by the New Jersey court, however,
that reason was exclusively for the benefit of gracious Iowa hosts and to
deter a display of ingratitude only by Iowa guests; therefore, the reason
was not convertible into a legitimate Iowa interest since neither host
nor guest was an Iowa domiciliary. One could (and for the purpose of
examining the propriety of the court's treatment of New Jersey dis-
positive law and Connecticut indicative law, I shall) assert that Iowa's
concern for the gracious host and disdain for the ungrateful guest
exists as to any such host-guest relationship entered into in Iowa, re-
gardless of the domiciliaries of host and guest. The assertion could be
substantiated by an assumed Iowa purpose of thus encouraging one
driving in Iowa to share his vehicle with a friend. Given that asserted
reason for and purpose of the Iowa guest statute, Iowa would have a
legitimate interest in having its guest statute applied. That makes the
interests of New Jersey and Connecticut potentially relevant, since if
either state has an interest adverse to that of Iowa the competing in-
terests would have to be weighed by the court.
First, New Jersey's interest. As viewed by the court, the absence of
a guest statute in New Jersey suggested an interest in having the New
Jersey defendants in the case "held to the full measure of damages or
the standard of care which that state's law provide for. A state should
not only be concerned with the protection and self-interest of its
citizens."'17 As altruistic as that language may be, I would suggest that
it was misdirected in Pfau. I think the intuitive reaction of the court
in looking to New Jersey's dispositive law as the basic source of a
potential New Jersey interest was entirely correct. But I do not accept
17. 55 N.J. at 524, 263 A.2d at 186.
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the interest which the court discerned in that dispositive law. If New
Jersey has no guest statute, it is probably because of a legislative deci-
sion that an innocent and injured guest-passenger should receive com-
pensation from the negligent host-driver. The principal reason for that
decision is to protect the economic integrity of that guest-passenger. He
and all members of that specific class are those intended to be benefited
and protected by New Jersey's dispositive law. Even more specifically,
the class intended to be protected by that dispositive law consists of
New Jersey domiciled guest-passengers injured by the negligence of
host-drivers. Consequently, New Jersey's dispositive law (no guest sta-
tute) exists to benefit and protect New Jersey guest-passengers. It's
true, of course, that such benefit and protection result in the imposi-
tion of liability on negligent host-drivers, but that isn't the critical
reason for the dispositive law; it's simply an incidental consequence
thereof. Thus, given the facts of Pfau, New Jersey's dispositive law
should not be read as giving rise to a significant interest on the part of
New Jersey. The injured guest was not domiciled in New Jersey, and,
although the allegedly negligent host was, he isn't within the specific
class of persons intended to be benefited or protected by New Jersey's
dispositive law.18
It would seem, then, that simply because a litigant is domiciled in a
state, that state doesn't invariably and automatically have a substantial
interest in the choice-of-law problem to be resolved. Rather, the exis-
tence of such a substantial interest, and, if it exists, the degree and
extent of such an interest, should be determined basically by examin-
ing that domicile state's dispositive law. If the dispositive law was in-
tended to benefit and protect a specific class of which the domiciled
litigant is a member, the domicile state has a substantial legitimate
interest and the degree and extent of the interest is that spelled out in
the dispositive law. Similarly, if the dispositive law was intended
primarily to be punitive or adverse toward a specific class of persons of
which the domiciled litigant is a member, the domicile state has a
substantial legitimate interest-that spelled out in its dispositive law.
Where the dispositive law is intended to have such an adverse effect
18. I am assuming that the absence of a guest statute is not intended primarily to be
conduct regulating. However, even assuming such regulation to be a primary reason for
New Jersey's dispositive law, the New Jersey host-driver would not have been within the
specific class of persons intended to be so regulated since his conduct occurred in Iowa.
For a judicial statement that the presence of a guest statute manifests a conduct regu-
lating purpose see Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 358, 222 A.2d 205, 211 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
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on a specific class, in all likelihood, it is intended to be conduct regulat-
ing, in the sense of regulation through deterrence. And, given the
usual paramount interest of each state in regulating conduct within its
borders, the state's interest is most likely to be substantial in those
cases where the conduct occurred in that state. Thus, the dispositive
law of a state may be intended primarily to be either protective and
beneficial or punitive and adverse toward a specific class of persons. In
either event, where the dispositive law is thus sharply focused upon a
specific class of persons, it manifests a significant interest on the part of
the domicile state in the issue involving its domiciliary who is within
that specific class. Conversely, if the domiciliary is not within the speci-
fic class intended to be benefited and protected or adversely affected by
the dispositive law of his domicile state-even though he is incidentally
affected by that law-his state of domicile does not have a significant
interest in the resolution of the choice-of-law problem.
Now Connecticut. If we assume that the reason underlying Connec-
ticut's dispositive law (no guest statute) is the same as that underlying
the same New Jersey dispositive law, Connecticut does have a sig-
nificant interest in the choice-of-law problem. The plaintiff, a Connec-
ticut domiciliary and the injured guest-passenger, is within the specific
class of persons intended to be benefited and protected by Connec-
ticut's dispositive law. Having earlier concluded (for the purpose
stated) that Iowa has a legitimate interest in the application of its guest
statute, a conflict exists between that Iowa interest and the interest of
Connecticut in having the injured guest recover from the negligent
host. For a court engaged in interest analysis (as the New Jersey court
was in Pfau) the chore now becomes to determine which of the "com-
peting states" has the greater interest in the issue to be resolved.
Counsel for the defendants asserted to the New Jersey court that an
examination of Connecticut's indicative law would be an appropriate
means of determining the significance of that state's interest in having
its guest recover. More precisely, counsel argued that, since a Connec-
ticut court confronted with the Pfau facts would impose the Iowa guest
statute, this evidenced a diminished interest on the part of Connec-
ticut. The argument makes sense. Having determined from Connec-
ticut dispositive law that Connecticut has a significant interest and the
basic extent and degree of that interest, the court could gain enormous
insight into how critical Connecticut considers that interest to be in a
choice-of-law setting by determining how a Connecticut court would
289
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react if the case were laid before it. If the Connecticut court would
"prefer" Iowa's interest in having its guest statute imposed over
Connecticut's interest in having its guest recover, why doesn't that
evidence a diminished interest on the part of Connecticut?
At least a part of the New Jersey court's response to that question
was that lex loci delicti (Connecticut's indicative law) "does not iden-
tify that state's interest in the matter."'19 Well, maybe so, maybe not. A
clear implication in the court's language is that (1) if Connecticut
utilized interest analysis to resolve the same choice-of-law problem,
and (2) concluded that the Iowa guest statute was applicable, then (3)
Connecticut's resolution of the conflicts issue would tend to "identify
that state's interest in the matter."20 The question then becomes:
Should the results achieved by a court employing lex loci delicti to
resolve choice-of-law problems be used by courts in other states to en-
hance or diminish the interests of the lex loci state?
The question can arise in two different settings. In the first, the
answer seems rather clear. If the forum determines that State A's
precedent utilized lex loci delicti, but the highest appellate court of
State A hasn't resolved a choice-of-law problem for twenty years, the
forum probably should not permit State A's interest in the particular
issue to be affected by its hoary usage of lex loci delicti. After all,
twenty years ago not many courts recognized the possibility that the
manner in which they resolved conflicts problems could affect their
states' interests as viewed by courts in other states in such problems.
But let's take the second situation. If the highest appellate court of
State A expressly rejects interest analysis and decides to retain lex loci
delicti, it cannot come as an unfair surprise to that court if another
forum reads the result achieved as evidencing State A's interest in the
issue. In effect, the State A court has determined that, notwithstanding
any legitimate interests of State A in the issue presented, it will resolve
the choice-of-law problem through lex loci delicti. For example, Con-
necticut's retention of lex loci delicti in a case in which that indicative
law operates to the detriment of a Connecticut domiciliary within the
specific class of persons intended to be benefited and protected by
Connecticut dispositive law is a conscious decision to "sacrifice" the
Connecticut domiciliary to the presumed advantages of the retention
of lex loci delicti, whether the advantages are stated in terms of ease of
19. 55 N.J. at 526, 263 A.2d at 137.
20. Id.
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application or certainty of result. If Connecticut is willing to abstain
from the imposition of its dispositive law intended to benefit a specific
class of persons, including the Connecticut litigant before the court, and
to apply the dispositive law of Iowa to the detriment of that Connec-
ticut litigant, for the presumed advantages of retaining lex loci delicti,
it has evidenced the degree of its interest in the Connecticut domi-
ciliary, like it or not. In fact, if Connecticut's use of lex loci delicti to
the detriment of the Connecticut domiciliary is not read as evidence
of a diminished interest on the part of Connecticut, that state and all
others retaining lex loci delicti would enjoy a seemingly inappropriate
advantage over those states utilizing interest analysis. A court which
determined to prefer the interest of Iowa in having its guest statute
applied even to the detriment of a passenger-domiciliary of the forum
state, and did so through interest analysis, could anticipate having that
determination read as a diminished interest in the specific issue
presented when the same issue arises in another forum. There seems
to be no justification for ignoring the same result achieved by Connec-
ticut simply because the result is the product of lex loci delicti.
In a dissenting opinion in Cipolla v. Shaposka,2 1 Mr. Justice
Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went somewhat further.
Confronted with a choice of law between Delaware's guest statute and
Pennsylvania's common law, he noted that Delaware, through its "re-
fusal to abandon the rule of lex loci," 22 had declined to impose its own
guest statute in a case between a Delaware passenger and a Delaware
host where plaintiff's injuries were sustained in New Jersey, a common
law state. Mr. Justice Roberts stated:
Although the rationale for the choice of law was the court's refusal
to abandon lex loci, the result of the decision is that Delaware it-
self limits the scope of its policy and the protection it will give to
its resident-hosts.23
Justice Roberts found that decision relevant to a determination of
Delaware's interest in having its guest statute applied even to a case in
which a passenger sustained his injuries in Delaware. If I read Mr.
Justice Roberts' opinion correctly, his feeling is that if Delaware is
sufficiently disinterested in protecting its own defendant-hosts, by re-
taining lex loci delicti to the detriment of those hosts where the passen-
21. 439 Pa. 563, 568, 267 A.2d 854, 857 (1970). For a symposium on Cipolla see 9 DuQ.
L. Rav. 347 (1971).
22. 439 Pa. at 576, 267 A.2d at 861 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id.
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gers' injuries are sustained in common law states, Delaware's interest in
protecting its defendant-host is diminished even in a case where the
passenger's injuries are sustained in Delaware-which was the case
before the Pennsylvania court. His feeling, apparently, is that a state
willing to have its interests in its domiciliaries depend on the "chance"
outcome provided by lex loci delicti evidences a generally diminished
degree of interest in those domiciliaries. I would not go that far. Even
conceding the factual accuracy of the conclusion that having its protec-
tive dispositive law applicable to its domiciliaries only when lex loci
delicti fortuitously so dictates is a kind of Russian roulette and, there-
fore, evidences a diminished interest on the part of the state involved,
I would be reluctant to read lex loci delicti as inexorably diminishing
the state's interest for a couple of reasons. First, it seems to me an in-
appropriate penalty to impose on a state simply because of the decision
of its highest appellate court to retain lex loci delicti. Second, it seems
to me a judicial impropriety for the forum to find a diminished interest
on the part of a sister state in a set of operative facts in which even
under lex loci delicti the court of that sister state would apply its pro-
tective dispositive law for the benefit of its own domiciliary.
Consequently, from Pfau and Cipolla, I draw these conclusions:
First, whether or not a state has a substantial interest in protecting and
benefiting (or adversely affecting) one of the litigants (even one do-
miciled within the state), and the degree and extent of that substantial
interest if it exists, should be determined primarily from the disposi-
tive law of that state. If the litigant is within the specific class of
persons intended to be benefited and protected by the state's disposi-
tive law, that substantial interest does exist; if he is not, it does not.
Second, assuming such a substantial interest is found to exist in the
state's dispositive law, that interest may be found by the forum to be
enhanced or diminished as a result of the same state's indicative law,
whether interest analysis or lex loci delicti.
Let's see what happens when those conclusions are applied to Chief
Justice Traynor's decision in Reich v. Purcell.24 Mrs. Reich and her
two sons, domiciled in Ohio, were driving west to California, (where,
eventually, they contemplated establishing a new domicile) and the
defendant Purcell, domiciled in California, was driving east on vaca-
tion. The vehicles met in a tragic collision in Missouri. Mrs. Reich and
one of her two sons were killed in the collision. Subsequently, Mr.
24. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
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Reich and the surviving son brought a wrongful death action against
Purcell in California. At the time that action was commenced, the
plaintiffs had abandoned their Ohio domiciles and had acquired Cali-
fornia domiciles. Missouri had a $25,000 ceiling on wrongful death
action recoveries; 25 neither Ohio nor California has any ceiling on such
recoveries. Defendant asserted the applicability of Missouri's ceiling
and the trial court accepted the assertion "because the accident oc-
curred there. '2 6 Writing for the Supreme Court of California, Justice
Traynor reversed.
Abandoning lex loci delicti and embracing interest analysis, Justice
Traynor concluded that Missouri had "little or no interest" in hav-
ing its ceiling imposed. Justice Traynor then made this observation
about California's dispositive law and interest:
[S]ince California has no limitation of damages, it also has no
interest in applying its law on behalf of defendant. As a forum
that is therefore disinterested in the only issue in dispute, we must
decide whether to adopt the Ohio or the Missouri rule as the rule
of decision for this case.28
The first sentence of that excerpt indicates that, despite defendant's
California domicile, California had no substantial interest in preserv-
ing his economic integrity. The reason for that conclusion existed in
California's dispositive law which imposed no ceiling on damages.
That dispositive law could have been perceived in either of two ways:
(1) it was intended to benefit and protect plaintiffs in wrongful death
actions and therefore defendant was not within the specific class in-
tended to be benefited and protected, or (2) it was intended to impose
unlimited liability on defendants in wrongful death actions and there-
fore created a California interest in imposing such liability on Purcell.
The New Jersey court in Pfau read its own dispositive law (no guest
statute) in the second sense. I believe Justice Traynor read California's
dispositive law in the first sense, since the next sentence in the above
excerpt characterized the California court as a "disinterested" forum.
Apparently, Justice Traynor concluded, that because the defendant
was not within the specific class of persons intended to be affected by
California's dispositive law, and that the adverse consequences of that
25. Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 36, § 537.090 (1955). The statute was amended in 1967 to raise
the ceiling on recovery to $50,000. Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 36, § 537.090 (Supp. 1973).
26. 67 Cal. 2d at 553, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
27. Id. at 556, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
28. Id., 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
293
Duquesne Law Review
law on such defendants were merely incidental to the primary purpose
of the law, California had no substantial interest in the issue as it
affected the defendant, despite his California domicile. That conclu-
sion is wholly consistent with the first conclusion drawn above by me
from consideration of Pfau and Cipolla. It's comforting to find so
eminent a jurist as Justice Traynor on my side-at least for me.
Confronted with an Ohio domicile of the Reich family at the time
of the collision and a California domicile of the surviving Reich family
when suit was initiated, Justice Traynor had to decide which domicile
was legally controlling. He selected the Ohio domicile, because, "if
the choice of law were made to turn on events happening after the
accident, forum shopping would be encouraged. '2 9 As between Mis-
souri and Ohio, the court easily concluded that Ohio's interest was
clearly superior. Ohio was the plaintiffs' (legally cognizable) domicile.
Its dispositive law (no ceiling on recovery) was intended to benefit a
specific class into which the plaintiffs fit perfectly. In fact, given the
conclusions that California was "disinterested" and Missouri had
"little or no interest," it would be fair to suggest that Ohio's interest
was either exclusive or overriding. And that raises the second con-
clusion suggested earlier: forum recourse to the indicative law of a
state having a substantial interest in the issue to be resolved. Un-
fortunately, Justice Traynor did not examine Ohio's indicative law.
Instead, once finding Ohio's interest to predominate, he applied that
state's dispositive law and no ceiling was imposed. Had the court
looked to Ohio's indicative law as it existed at the time of the deci-
sion in Reich it would have discovered that the highest appellate court
of that state resolved choice-of-law issues in tort cases through lex
loci delicti.30 Thus, had the Reich case been laid before an Ohio court,
the Missouri ceiling would have been imposed.
In this instance, the Ohio indicative law should not have been
given the effect of enhancing or diminishing that state's interest.
After all, that interest was already determined to be either exclusive
or overriding; it could hardly have been enhanced. Once the forum
determines that another state's interest in the issue to be resolved
29. Id. In my opinion, the change of domicile should have been recognized legally.
See Seidelson, Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The Wrongful
Death Action, 10 DUQ. L. Rav. 525, 529 (1972).
30. Goranson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 984 (1966). More recently, Ohio has abandoned its rigid adherence to lex loci
delicti. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc. v. Fox, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
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is exclusive or overriding, the forum should resolve the issue exactly
as it would be resolved by a court sitting in that other state. I know,
that's renvoi, and renvoi is a dirty word in most American courts.
But only because they tend to misconceive its function.31 Had the
California forum determined to "play" renvoi with Ohio because of
Ohio's exclusive or overriding interest, it would not have embarked
on an endless carrousel ride (despite the contrary suggestion in Pfau).
It simply would have done what an Ohio court would have done:
impose the Missouri ceiling. Instead, Justice Traynor wound up
treating the plaintiffs differently and far better than they would have
been treated by a court sitting in the state having the only substantial
interest in the issue. Apparently, Justice Traynor would not concur
in my second suggested conclusion: the forum should be mindful
of and sensitive to an indicative law of a state whose dispositive law
gives it a substantial interest in the issue to be resolved. Well, one
out of two isn't too bad-for me.
That sensitivity to the indicative law of a state having a substantial
interest in the issue to be resolved has been evidenced by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Tramontana
v. Varig Airlines.3 2 Vincent Tramontana was a member of the United
States Navy Band which was engaged in a concert tour of South Amer-
ica. The plane carrying the band collided in mid-air over Brazil with
one of the defendant's commercial flights. All aboard both planes
died. Mrs. Tramontana brought a wrongful death action against the
defendant. It asserted the applicability of the Brazilian ceiling on
recoveries arising out of airplane catastrophes: 100,000 cruzeiros,
which at the time of suit converted into $170.11 Plaintiff asked the
court to decline to impose the Brazilian ceiling because "it is contrary
to [a] strong public policy of the forum. 34 The court recognized that
its role of "forum qua forum"3 5 did not justify a refusal to apply
Brazilian law simply because it differed from that of the forum. Then,
sua sponte, the court recognized the significant interest of Maryland
in the specific issue presented, arising out of "decedent's and [plain-
31. See Seidelson, The Americanization of Renvoi, 7 DuQ. L Rav. 201 (1969).
32. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
33. "Varig relied on Article 102 of the Brazilian Code, which limits liability for injury
or death in aviation accidents to that amount." Id. at 469.
34. Id. at 470.
35. Id. at 476. The self-restraint of the forum in refusing to supplant applicable
foreign law with forum policy, especially absent a full faith and credit mandate, is to be
applauded. See Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal... Or Two, 31 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 462, 463-76 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Seidelson].
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tiff's] residence" 36 there. Maryland's dispositive law imposes no ceiling
similar to that of Brazil. Presumably that is so because Maryland
wishes to protect and benefit those injured in airplane catastrophes
and those who become surviving dependents as a result of such catas-
trophes. The plaintiff, surviving widow, clearly comes within the specific
class intended to be protected and benefited. Thus, Maryland's dis-
positive law demonstrates a substantial interest in the plaintiff, a
Maryland domiciliary. "[I]t is on the citizens of Maryland that the
burden of her support, if she is unable to support herself, is likely to
fall in the first instance. ' '3 T The court noted, too, the substantial in-
terest of Brazil as evidenced by its dispositive law, imposing the ceiling
on recovery:
Varig is a Brazilian corporation which, as a national airline, is
an object of concern in terms of national policy. To Brazil, the
success of this enterprise is a matter not only of pride and com-
mercial well-being, but perhaps even of national security. The
limitation on recovery against airlines operating in Brazil was
enacted in the early days of commercial aviation, no doubt with
a view toward protecting what was then, and still is, an infant
industry of extraordinary public and national importance ...
The focus of Brazilian concern could hardly be clearer.38
Having identified substantial interests on the part of both Maryland
and Brazil, the court was confronted with the most difficult aspect of
interest analysis, determination of the superior interest. For assistance
in that chore, the court looked to Maryland's indicative law. There
the court found reason to conclude that if the operative facts of the
case were laid before a Maryland court that court would impose the
Brazilian ceiling. In the view of the forum, that diminished Maryland's
interest in relation to that of Brazil:
[If] a Maryland court would not disregard Brazilian law for the
benefit of one of its own residents in a suit brought there, why
should a court sitting in the District of Columbia do so at the
expense of substantial and legitimate, interests of Brazil?3 9
It should be noted that the court did not find Maryland's interest
36. 350 F.2d at 473.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 471.
39. Id. at 475. Maryland has, since the decision in Tramontana, declined to embrace
interest analysis and continues to utilize lex lod delicti in resolving choice-of-law prob-
lems in tort cases. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). noted in 27 MD. L. Rv.
85 (1967).
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exclusive or overriding. Therefore, the renvoi resolution suggested
by me in regard to Reich would not be applicable. Instead, the court,
having identified substantial interests on the part of two jurisdictions,
examined the indicative law of Maryland to gain additional insight
into the degree of Maryland's interest. That indicative law demon-
strated to the forum a diminution of Maryland's interest. And the
indicative law which had that effect-the indicative law which would
have led a Maryland court to impose the Brazilian ceiling-was lex
loci delicti. I take Tramontana to support the proposition that the
indicative law of an interested state may enhance or diminish that
state's interests in the issue to be resolved, even if the indicative law
be lex loci delicti.
In Gaither v. Myers,40 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had these facts: Defendant, domiciled in the
District of Columbia, left his station wagon in the District of Columbia
parked and unattended with the keys in the tailgate. This was in
violation of a District of Columbia Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regula-
tion.41 The wagon was stolen and the thief operated it in such a negli-
gent manner that it collided with a car operated by the plaintiff, a
Maryland domiciliary. The collision occurred in Maryland about five
miles from the District of Columbia line. To recover for the personal
injury and property damage he suffered, plaintiff sued defendant in
the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia traffic regulation
violated by the defendant has long been construed by District of
Columbia courts to give rise to a cause of action on the part of an
injured and innocent plaintiff against the violator for harm negligently
inflicted by a thief.42 Maryland has a similar statute,48 but the Court
of Appeals of Maryland has determined that its violation does not
give rise to such a civil cause of action.44 The issue for the court was
the applicability of the District of Columbia dispositive law to a claim
for injuries sustained in Maryland by a Maryland domiciliary. In
looking to the reasons, underlying the District of Columbia dispositive
law, the court found that one of its purposes was to deter drivers
from leaving unattended parked cars with keys "to prevent strangers
40. 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
41. WASHINGTON, D.C., TRAFFIC & MOTOR VEHICLE REG. art. XIV, § 98.
42. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944).
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 11-1101 (1970), recodifiing § 247 (1951).
44. Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. 404, 226 A.2d 548 (1967); Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md.
62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959).
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from... stealing the car and injuring others." 45 The court cited with
approval language from Ross v. Hartman4 characterizing the District
of Columbia law as a "safety measure."4 7 Thus, the dispositive law
of the District of Columbia focused directly upon a specific class of
persons which included the District of Columbia domiciled defen-
dant-those leaving cars parked in the District with keys in the cars
That dispositive law was not intended to benefit or protect members,
of that class; rather, it was intended to sting them and, by the sting,.
to regulate their conduct. The law was found to be conduct regulat-
ing, in the sense of regulation through deterrence; the conduct oc-
curred in the District of Columbia and the actor was a District of
Columbia domiciliary. Defendant was indeed within the specific class
of persons intended to be adversely affected by the dispositive law of
the District of Columbia, and, therefore, the District had a substantial
interest in having its dispositive law applied. And so the court con-
cluded.
The court then examined the reasons underlying the Maryland
dispositive law (no civil liability for violation of the statute). The
court determined that the Maryland conclusion that the statute vio-
lator's act was not the proximate cause of the victim's injury, because
the thief's conduct was an intervening, superseding cause, evidenced
a protective policy directed toward Maryland drivers. Apparently,
Maryland desires to protect its defendant-drivers from the economic
impact of liability for injuries inflicted by car thieves. Since the defen-
dant before the court was a District of Columbia domiciliary, he was.
not within the specific class of persons intended to be protected by the
Maryland dispositive law. Consequently, Maryland had no substantial
interest in the application of its dispositive law. Finding that the
application of District of Columbia dispositive law would further that
jurisdiction's substantial interest without frustrating any substantial
interest of Maryland, the court characterized the conflict as "false" 4
and applied the dispositive law of the District of Columbia. That's
using the dispositive law of each potentially interested jurisdiction to.
determine whether or not each really-has a substantial interest, and,
if so, the degree and extent of that interest.
45. 404 F.2d at 220.
46. 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944).
47. 404 F.2d at 220.
48. Id. at 224.
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And now, back to A bendschein-almost. With the reader's con-
tinued indulgence, I'd like to take a preliminary liberty with the
Abendschein case. Let's place it before a wholly disinterested forum
which has embraced interest analysis, retaining all of the actual opera-
tive facts of the case. Confronted with defendants' assertion of the
total immunity of the Ontario guest statute and plaintiffs' insistence
that either the dispositive law of New York (no guest statute) or of
Michigan (guest statute with partial immunity, but immunity not
available to defendants on the basis of plaintiffs' pleadings), the court
would be expected to identify the reasons underlying the dispositive
laws of the potentially interested jurisdictions and then determine to
what extent those reasons were convertible into legitimate interests in
the particular case. Let's start with New York. Since it has no guest
statute, its dispositive law presumably is aimed at benefiting and pro-
tecting guest-passengers injured by the negligence of host-drivers. To
sharpen the focus somewhat, it could be said that New York's disposi-
tive law is intended to benefit and protect New York domiciled guest-
passengers injured by the negligence of host-drivers. The two surviving
passengers and the deceased passenger whose death gave rise to the
wrongful death action were domiciled in New York. Each fits within
the specific class of persons intended to be benefited and protected
by New York's dispositive law. New York, then, can be said to have
a substantial interest in the application of its dispositive law.
The existence of a guest statute in Michigan indicates an intention
on the part of that state to protect Michigan domiciled host-drivers
(and perhaps Michigan based lessors of vehicles operated by those
Michigan host-drivers). The degree and extent of that protective in-
terest can be determined from the degree and extent of the protection
provided by the Michigan guest statute. The statute grants Michigan
host-drivers immunity from liability to injured guest-passengers unless
the drivers' culpability rises to the level of "gross negligence or willful
and wanton misconduct." Since the pleadings alleged that the host-
driver was driving "at speeds of 90 miles per hour around curves while
intoxicated," it seems fair to conclude that, on the pleadings, defen-
dant driver was not intended to enjoy the partial immunity from
liability extended by the Michigan guest statute.
New York's dispositive law provides a basis for determining that
that state has a substantial interest in having its domiciled plaintiffs
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recover. Michigan's dispositive law evidences no substantial interest
in having its domiciled defendants protected from liability. That
leaves Ontario. "The object of Ontario's guest statute, it has been
said, is 'to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers,
in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies' . . . and,
quite obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented by
the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their
insurance carriers, not [non-Ontario] defendants and their insurance
carriers. '49 Since defendants in Abendschein were Michigan-based and
since the vehicle was presumably insured there, defendants were not
within the specific class of persons intended to be protected by the
Ontario statute. Examination of Ontario's dispositive law, then, re-
veals no substantial interest on the part of Ontario in the defendants
or in the application of Ontario law.
Our hypothetical disinterested forum would be left with the deter-
minations that (1) New York has a substantial interest in the applica-
tion of its dispositive law (no guest statute) and in the New York
domiciled plaintiffs, (2) Michigan has a substantial interest in the
application of its dispositive law (partial immunity guest statute) and
in the Michigan-based defendants, but (3) the substantial interest
evidenced in Michigan's dispositive law does not reach the degree of
culpability on the part of host-driver alleged by the plaintiffs, there-
fore (4) defendants' motions for summary judgment must be denied.
Hell, it's an easy case for a court engaged in interest analysis, present-
ing as it does a Michigan guest statute permitting recovery for in-
juries occasioned by gross negligence, plaintiffs' allegation of host-
driver's gross negligence, and defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment. Of course, later, when it might be required to determine
whether New York or Michigan had the superior interest for the
purpose of deciding the applicability of the Michigan guest statute
(given a factual question as to the level of culpability of defendant-
driver's conduct), the forum would find the decision considerably more
difficult. But that need not concern us now. For the present, it is.
adequate to conclude that a forum engaged in interest analysis would
not utilize the Ontario guest statute since Ontario has no significant.
interest in the imposition of its guest statute.
If I may, let me suggest a couple of other reasons for the forum's.
49. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,.
750 (1963).
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non-use of the Ontario guest statute: the full faith and credit clause 0
and the due process clause 5' of the Federal Constitution.
Were the forum to impose the Ontario guest statute to the jeopardy
of the plaintiffs, they would seem to have a legitimate full faith and
credit argument. Since the only jurisdictions having legitimate in-
terests in the issue presented are New York and Michigan and since
the forum is in a sister state, non-application of the applicable disposi-
tive law of either interested state, resulting from application of the
dispositive law of Ontario, a jurisdiction having no legitimate interest,
violates the mandate of Article IV, section 1. Similarly, imposition of
Ontario's dispositive law in circumstances where that jurisdiction has
no legitimate interest in the issue to be resolved and to the jeopardy
of the plaintiffs, denies them property without due process. There
may even be a second approach available to the plaintiffs to make
the due process argument. Since the reason underlying the Ontario
50. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The "implementing" legislation provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory, or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the Clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory, or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
I am aware of the controversy surrounding applicability of the clause to the decisional
law of a state. I believe it to be so applicable.
The Constitution by use of the term "public acts" clearly includes statutes.... But
it makes no mention of decisional law. . . .It is not far-fetched to argue that full
faith and credit for judicial proceedings requires recognition of their effect as de-
cisional law, if they have that effect in the state where rendered, as well as of their
res judicata effect. In any event, while the point seems not to have been discussed,
the Court has so acted and talked that we may deal with this part of our subject
on the assumption that what is entitled in proper cases to credit is the law of the
state by whatever source declared. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915);
Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430, 445 (1943).
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers' Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 12 (1945); Seidelson, supra note 35, at 464. Contra, Nadelmann, Full Faith and
Credit to Judgments and Public Acts-A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L.
REy. 33, 75 (1957). Compare Walker, A Criticism of Professor Weintraub's Presentation of
Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 57 IOWA L. REv. 1248 (1972), with Weintraub, Response to
the Critique of Professors Sedler, Twerski, and Walker, 57 IowA L. REv. 1258, 1268 (1972),
for more recent contrasting views concerning the potential applicability of the full faith
and credit clause to the choice-of-law process.
51. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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guest statute is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case, utilization
of that guest statute by the forum would deprive the plaintiffs of
property by the imposition of a body of dispositive law they could
never have contemplated being applied to defeat their action. Of
course, the plaintiffs were in Ontario, volitionally and as guest-pas-
sengers. But their presence in Ontario as passengers in a Michigan car
driven by a Michigan driver was wholly unrelated to the purpose to
be served by the province's guest statute. To utilize the statute to
deprive the plaintiffs of their cause of action would be a little like
determining the culpability of a driver on a New York highway
pursuant to Ontario's rules of the road because the driver had had
lunch in Ontario.
I conclude, therefore, that imposition of the Ontario guest statute
by the disinterested forum engaged in interest analysis would be
painfully inept and constitutionally impermissible. What must be
determined now is whether or not that same result achieved by the
Supreme Court of Michigan by the application of lex loci delicti is
any less inept or impermissible.
The substantial interests of New York and Michigan as manifested
in their dispositive laws remain exactly the same: New York has a
substantial interest in having the New York plaintiffs receive the bene-
fit of recovery unimpeded by any guest statute. Michigan has a sub-
stantial interest in having the Michigan defendants receive the pro-
tection of immunity from liability unless host-driver's conduct was
grossly negligent; if it was, Michigan's dispositive law evidences no
interest in protecting the defendants from liability. Plaintiffs' alleged
the driver's conduct was grossly negligent, and, in ruling on defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment, the allegation was accepted
by the court. I find myself compelled to the conclusion that applica-
tion of the Ontario guest statute by the Michigan court is as inept
and impermissible as would have been the same result achieved by
the disinterested forum. Since the competing interests of Michigan
and New York are exactly the same, and since the total lack of legiti-
mate interest on the part of Ontario remains the same, the only dif-
ferences which arise by shifting the case from our disinterested forum
to Michigan are: (1) the Michigan forum utilizes lex loci delicti in-
stead of interest analysis, and (2) the full faith and credit clause may
become inapplicable.
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Let's begin with the full faith and credit clause. With Michigan
the forum and an interested state, there can be no full faith and credit
mandate that the forum apply the dispositive law of sister state New
York. The Michigan forum would be justified in applying its own
dispositive law, at least so far as the full faith and credit clause is
concerned. But still recognizing the lack of any legitimate interest on
the part of Ontario, the Michigan forum, in order to avoid constitu-
tional impropriety, would be required to select the dispositive law of
Michigan or of New York. Application of the dispositive law of
Ontario would be as violative of due process as it would have been
with the hypothetical disinterested forum. The Michigan forum, then,
has three potential choices, the dispositive law of Michigan, the dis-
positive law of New York or the dispositive law of Ontario. The
third choice is precluded by the due process clause. Since the remain-
ing two choices require application of the dispositive law of a state
of the United States, each substantially interested in the issue pre-
sented, each would be permissible under the full faith and credit
clause. However, whichever of the two dispositive laws is utilized,
New York's common law or Michigan's guest statute, the defendants'
motions for summary judgment must be denied. Under the dispositive
law of either state, the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint set
forth a legally sufficient cause of action. Consequently, even if the
Michigan forum favors its own dispositive law over that of New York,
plaintiffs prevail.
Can the Michigan forum justify application of the Ontario guest
statute on the ground that it is, after all, simply the "chance" result
produced by lex loci delicti? I think not. If imposition of the Ontario
guest statute is precluded constitutionally, it cannot be imposed simply
because the forum was "well intentioned." The majority opinion in
A bendschein (as well as the separate opinion of the author of the
majority opinion)52 makes clear that the court was not engaged in a
calculated scheme aimed at violating any constitutional right of the
plaintiffs. Still, if that is the consequence of the court's opinion, and
I think it is, the unconstitutional result is not made acceptable simply
because of the absence of judicial mala fides. Given the unchanged
substantial interests of Michigan and New York, and the lack of any
legitimate interest on the part of Ontario, application of the Ontario
52. 382 Mich. at 524, 170 N.W.2d at 143.
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guest statute by the Michigan forum through lex loci delicti is as
inept and unconstitutional as it would have been for the disinterested
forum utilizing interest analysis.
How in the world did the Supreme Court of Michigan arrive at a
result so inept and impermissible? Part of the answer, of course, may
lie in that court's disagreement with my conclusion that its result
was constitutionally impermissible. Indeed, the reader may share in
that disagreement. If so, my case is either untenable or not persuasively
presented. That decision is for the reader. I believe, however, that
the Michigan court's result manifests a couple of other shortcomings
on the part of that court. First, the court seems not to have realized
that, to the extent that Michigan was an interested state, the degree
and extent of its interest should have been determined primarily
from its own dispositive law. Second, the court seems not to have
realized that, absent any legitimate interest on the part of Ontario,
application of Ontario's dispositive law to determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties is manifestly inappropriate. Neither of those
oversights is terribly surprising, in view of Michigan's retention of
lex loci delicti. After all, both of those considerations are intimately
connected with interest analysis, and why should a court determined
to eschew interest analysis and retain lex loci delicti be concerned
with recognizing either the existence or the extent of potentially
competing state interests? The answer suggested by A bendschein is
that the absence of any judicial sensitivity to those interests may pro-
duce a result which is painfully inept or constitutionally imper-
missible. And I guess that's the message of prime importance to those
courts which have elected to retain lex loci delicti.
So far, I have suggested that courts engaged in interest analysis
may find it helpful in resolving choice-of-law problems to recognize
and take advantage of certain legal facts. These are:
1. In determining whether or not a potentially interested state has
a substantial interest in the issue presented, the forum should ex-
amine the dispositive law of that state. If one of the litigants is within
the specific class of persons intended to be directly affected by that
state's dispositive law, either beneficially or adversely, the state has a
substantial interest in the issue. The degree and extent of that sub-
stantial interest should be determined by the state's dispositive law.
If, on the other hand, neither of the litigants is within the specific
class of persons intended to be directly affected by that state's disposi-
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tive law, but, at most, is affected only incidentally by that dispositive
law, the state lacks a substantial interest in the issue.
2. After determining that two or more states have substantial in-
terests in the issue, and those substantial interests are in conflict, the
forum should examine the indicative laws of the competing states for
evidence of an enhanced or diminished interest in the issue. If the
indicative law of one of the competing states indicates that, given the
same set of operative facts, a court in that state would apply the dis-
positive law of the other competing state, the forum should take that
as evidence of a diminished interest on the part of the state whose
indicative law so indicates. If the indicative law of one of the com-
peting states indicates that, given the same set of operative facts, a
court in that state would apply its own dispositive law rather than
that of the competing state, the forum should take that as evidence of
an enhanced interest on the part of the state whose indicative law so
indicates. That potential of enhancing or diminishing the substantial
interest of a state exists whether that state's indicative law is lex loci
delicti or the product of interest analysis.
3. If the forum determines that one state has exclusive or over-
riding interests in the issue to be resolved, the forum should resolve
that issue as it would be resolved by a court sitting in the state having
exclusive or overriding interests, i.e., the forum should utilize the
indicative law of that state and then apply whatever dispositive law
is referred to by that state's indicative law.
To those states desirous of retaining lex loci delicti, I would offer
these suggestions:
1. If the application of lex loci delicti would result in the imposi-
tion of the dispositive law of a state having no legitimate interest in
the issue to be resolved, the result is inappropriate and constitutionally
impermissible.
2. Because of the first suggestion, the forum, despite its retention
of lex loci delicti, must be willing and able to determine at least
whether or not the state whose dispositive law is referred to by lex
loci delicti has any legitimate interest in the issue to be resolved.
With the reader's indulgence (one more time), I'd like to try some
of those suggestions on a couple of "problem" cases. Let's take first
a hypothetical case put forth by Professor Weintraub 53 and only
53. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 257 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as WEINTRAUB].
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slightly altered by me. D manufactured a car in State A, its state of
incorporation and principal place of business, which car it then
shipped to a dealer in State B, the shipment being f.o.b. place of
manufacture in State A. In State B, the dealer sold the car to H, whose
spouse, W, then drove it and suffered personal injuries when the car
crashed "because of a defect in construction."54 H and W are domiciled
in State B. To recover for her injuries, W sues D in State B, asserting
breach of implied warranty of merchantability. State B engages in
interest analysis. The dispositive law of State A, where D manufactured
the car, does not require privity as a condition precedent for the
assertion of breach of implied warranty. The dispositive law of State
B, W's domicile, does require privity. Which state's dispositive law
should the forum apply? "Here, even among those who would abandon
traditional conflicts rubrics in favor of a more functional analysis,
opinion is divided."'5 I think I know why.
When the forum looks to the dispositive law of State A, which does
not require privity, it may very well determine that the class of per-
sons intended to be benefited or protected by that law consists of
plaintiffs in product liability cases. More specifically, plaintiffs in
product liability cases who are domiciled in State A. W, domiciled in
State B, is not within the specific class. When the forum looks to
State B's dispositive law, which requires privity, it may very well
determine that the class of persons intended to be benefited or pro-
tected by that law consists of defendants in product liability cases.
Specifically, defendants in product liability cases who are domiciled
(or incorporated or having a principal place of business) in State B.
D, a State A corporation, is not within the specific class. Its true, of
course, that an incidental effect of State A's dispositive law would be
to impose liability on D, and that an incidental effect of State B's
dispositive law would be to preclude recovery by W, at least on the
theory of breach of implied warranty. But neither litigant is within
the specific class of persons intended to be affected directly and pri-
marily by the dispositive law of her or its domicile state. Consequently,
following the first suggestion made by me to courts engaging in interest
analysis, the forum would conclude that neither State A nor State B
had a substantial interest in the issue to be resolved. Examination of
the dispositive laws of the competing states leads to a negative stand-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 258.
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off. If there's one thing worse for a court engaged in interest analysis
than an evenly balanced set of competing interests, it's an evenly
balanced set of interests resulting from a determination that neither
"competing state" has a substantial interest in the issue. What's a
poor judge to do?
First, let me indicate a few things I think the court should not do.
I think it should not indulge in the presumption that, unless and
until some other state's interests are demonstrated to be clearly su-
perior, the forum should apply its own dispositive law.56 That forum-
favoring presumption seems uniquely inappropriate for a court pur-
porting to engage in a legitimate effort at resolving choice-of-law prob-
lems through interest analysis. It smacks a little bit of a handicapped
horse race in which the other fellow's horse always carries the greater
avoirdupois. I think the forum should not resolve the conflict by
determining which state's dispositive law is the "better rule of law."57
With apologies to Professor Leflar and those courts which have con-
sidered that "choice-influencing factor," it seems to me to convert the
choice-of-law process into a study of "comparative jurisprudence. '"58 I
concede that if the "better rule of law" is a legitimate "choice-in-
fluencing factor" anywhere, it should be so here, where neither state
has a substantial interest in the issue. Arguably, that puts W and D
"beyond the pale" and therefore susceptible to that dispositive law
considered by the forum to be superior. But neither litigant is truly
without the interest of its home state entirely. Although neither is a
primary beneficiary of the dispositive law of its home state, so that
neither state has a substantial interest in its domiciliary, each litigant
is still domiciled in one of the states. The naked fact of domicile,
uncomplemented by a dispositive law aimed at benefiting the dom-
56. For a judicial opinion applying this presumption in favor of forum law, see
Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
57. Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267,
295 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1584, 1587 (1966); WEINTRAUB, supra note 53, at 244 (the "Better Law" Syn-
drome). For judicial acceptance of the "better rule of law" as a choice influencing con-
sideration see Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. Horner, 38
Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). For judicial consideration of the "better rule of law"
where the interests of the competing states are evenly balanced see Cipolla v. Shaposka,
439 Pa. 563, 573, 267 A.2d 854, 859 (1970) (dissenting opinion). For adverse reaction to.
consideration of the "better rule of law" see D. CAVERS, THE CHOICaE-OF-LAw PROCESS 86(1965) [hereinafter cited as CAvERs]; Seidelson, Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DuQ.
L. REv. 423 (1971).
58. CAvRS, supra note 57. The phrase "comparative jurisprudence," used in this.
sense, is that of Professor Cavers. It seems to me that, as is often the case, his language
perfectly characterizes the situation.
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iciliary, while not enough to create a substantial interest, may be suf-
ficient to give rise to an interest less than substantial. After all, the
legal fact of domicile does exist. It gives each state a minimal interest
in its litigant and its litigant's economic integrity which should be
adequate to preclude a determination that either litigant is truly
"beyond the pale" and therefore subject to the forum's aloof deter-
mination of the better rule of law. Let's assume, then, that State A
has a minimal interest in D, its corporation, and State B has a minimal
interest in W, its domiciled plaintiff. Can the seemingly evenly bal-
anced minimal interests be handled in some legitimate fashion which
will permit the forum to make a reasoned choice-of-law decision
through interest analysis?
One approach immediately available to the forum is an examination
of the indicative laws of the competing states. We've already hypothe-
sized that State B, the forum, utilizes interest analysis. Let's assume
that State A characterizes warranty actions as sounding in contract and
applies lex loci contractus, with the reference being to the place where
manufacturer passes title to the goods. That means that if the opera-
tive facts were laid before a court sitting in State A, that court would
apply the dispositive law of State A, and that dispositive law does not
require privity. State A's indicative law, then, tends to diminish that
state's minimal interest in D, since it would permit the warranty
action to lie even though it threatens the economic integrity of D.
In turn, State B's relative interest is enhanced. That should be ade-
quate justification for the forum's application of State B's dispositive
law.
Of course, examination of each state's indicative law may not lead
to such a quick and easy solution. It may be that the indicative laws
tend to enhance or diminish the interests of each state in precisely the
same manner and degree. The forum may conclude that each state
has a minimal interest in its own domiciliary which remains relatively
consistent with the other state's interest even after consideration of
the indicative laws of both states. State A retains a minimal interest
in the economic integrity of D and State B a minimal interest in the
economic integrity of W. The forum then should inquire as to the
degree of frustration of each state's minimal interest depending on
which state's dispositive law is applied. If State A's dispositive law is
utilized, the warranty action will lie and that state's minimal interest
in the economic integrity of D will be frustrated, but perhaps not as
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much as State B's minimal interest in W's economic integrity would
be frustrated by application of that state's dispositive law. After all,
W is a natural person, not a corporate entity engaged in a manufactur-
ing enterprise, and, therefore, not as likely to be able to withstand
the violation of her economic integrity. 9 Consequently, the forum
may determine that its minimal interest in W's economic integrity
justifies the application of State A's dispositive law.
In Ryan v. Clark Equipment Co.,60 the California forum (apparently
without realizing it) was confronted with an analogous negative stand-
off, another "problem" case. Plaintiff, an Oregon domiciliary, sued
defendant, a Michigan corporation, in a wrongful death action arising
from death-producting injuries suffered by plaintiff's late husband in
Oregon, allegedly as a result of defendant's "negligence in design and
manufacture and breach of warranty" 61 in connection with a "front-
end loader. '62
Defendant asserted the Oregon ceiling on wrongful death action
recoveries which existed at the time of decedent's death.6 3 Plaintiff
argued that Michigan dispositive law, which had no such ceiling, was
applicable. The forum found Reich v. Purcell to be controlling and
imposed the Oregon ceiling. But Reich is easily distinguishable from
Ryan. In Reich, the domicile state of the wrongful death action bene-
ficiaries (Ohio, because of Justice Traynor's refusal to take cognizance
of the domicile change effected after decedent's death but before
trial) had no ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries. The plain-
tiffs, Ohio domiciliaries, were within the specific class of persons in-
tended to be benefited by that dispositive law. Ohio had a substantial
(indeed, exclusive or overriding) interest in the application of Ohio
law. In Ryan, the plaintiff was certainly not within the specific class
of persons intended to be benefited by Oregon's dispositive law limit-
ing recovery; that law was intended to benefit and protect Oregon
defendants in wrongful death actions. The adverse effect of that law
on Oregon plaintiffs was incidental to its primary purpose. Similarly,
the Michigan defendant was not within the specific class of persons
intended to be protected by Oregon's dispositive law. Michigan's dis-
59. See Seidelson, Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The Wrong-
ful Death Action, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 525, 538 (1972).
60. 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969).
61. Id. at 681, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
62. Id.
63. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 30.020 (1953). In 1967 the Oregon statute was amended
to eliminate the ceiling on recovery. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 30.020 (1971).
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positive law, containing no ceiling, was intended to benefit and pro-
tect Michigan plaintiffs in wrongful death actions; plaintiff was not
within that specific class of persons. And the adverse effect on Michigan
defendants in wrongful death actions, although real enough, is merely
incidental to the principal purpose of protecting Michigan bene-
ficiaries in wrongful death actions. Curiously, the court declined to
accept plaintiff's argument that Michigan's no-ceiling law was intended
to regulate manufacturing activities in Michigan without explicitly
noting that, consistent with the court's declination, defendant was
not within the specific class intended to be affected by Michigan's law
but merely one incidentally adversely affected by it. If Michigan's
no-ceiling law was not intended to be conduct regulating (and I think
the court was correct in concluding that it was not), it probably was
intended to benefit Michigan domiciled wrongful death action plain-
tiffs.
So in Ryan the forum had before it an Oregon plaintiff not within
the specific class of persons intended to be benefited and protected by
Oregon's dispositive law and a Michigan defendant not within the
specific class of persons intended to be primarily affected by Michigan's
dispositive law. Neither state had a substantial interest in its domiciled
litigant. A negative stand-off, at least in terms of substantial interests.
But each state could be said to have a minimal interest in its domiciled
litigant, simply as the result of domicile. Thus, it's minimal interest
against minimal interest before a disinterested forum utilizing interest
analysis.
:Had the forum looked to Michigan's indicative law for additional
relevant information regarding Michigan's minimal interest, it would
have found that law to be lex loci delicti, at least so far as the negli-
gence count was concerned. (Remember Abendschein?). Thus, if the
operative facts had been laid before a Michigan court, that court would
have applied the dispositive law of Oregon, including its ceiling on
recovery. That would seem to enhance Michigan's minimal interest in
the economic integrity of the Michigan-based defendant. 64 Had the
64. So far as the warranty count is concerned, Michigan might determine that it
sounds in contract and utilize lex loci contractus, with the reference being to the dis-
positive law of the state where defendant passed title to the goods. WEINTRAUB, supra
note 53, at 254-55. Let's assume title passed in Michigan. Then the Michigan court
would impose that state's no-ceiling dispositive law even to the economic jeopardy of
the Michigan defendant. That would tend to diminish Michigan's minimal interest in
its domiciliary. Thus, the forum might conclude from an examination of Michigan's
indicative law that that state's minimal interest in the economic integrity of the defen-
dant would be. enhanced insofar as the negligence count is concerned and diminished
310
Vol. 11: 283, 1973
Interest Analysis
forum looked to Oregon's indicative law, it would have found that
Oregon had embraced interest analysis.6 5 It may or may not have found
an Oregon decision in point.6 6 If it found such an Oregon decision,
that decision would indicate either that Oregon would apply its own
dispositive law or that of Michigan. If Oregon, like Michigan, would
apply Oregon dispositive law (ceiling on recovery), Oregon's minimal
interest in the economic integrity of the Oregon plaintiff would be
diminished. Given an enhancement of Michigan's minimal interest
and a diminution of Oregon's minimal interest, as evidenced by the
indicative laws of the states, the forum would apply Oregon's disposi-
tive law to the economic advantage of the Michigan defendant and the
disadvantage of the Oregon plaintiff. That's the result achieved by the
court in Ryan, but on the basis of Reich, a clearly distinguishable
case. Alternatively, if Oregon would apply Michigan dispositive law
(no ceiling), Oregon's minimal interest in the economic integrity of
the Oregon plaintiff would be enhanced. The forum would then have
an enhanced minimal interest on the part of each of the competing
states, and would have to go further to determine which state's interest
was superior. The forum could conclude, as was suggested in the hypo-
thetical case discussed above, that the greater economic capacity of the
Michigan corporate defendant to withstand the impact of an adverse
choice-of-law determination as compared with the Oregon widow in-
dicated that application of Michigan's dispositive law (no ceiling)
would do less violence to Michigan's enhanced minimal interest in the
economic integrity of the defendant than application of Oregon's dis-
positive law would do to that state's enhanced minimal interest in the
economic integrity of the plaintiff. In those circumstances, the forum
would apply Michigan's dispositive law and impose no ceiling on
recovery.
It would seem that even the problem cases can be handled rationally
insofar as the warranty count is concerned. If those conclusions seem paradoxical at best
and wildly divergent at worst, the explanation, I think, lies in Michigan's rejection of
interest analysis. "One effect of acceptance of state-interest analysis will be a significant
reduction, at least for choice-of-law purposes, in the importance of characterizing the
products liability issue as one of 'contract' or 'tort.'" WEINTRAUB, supra note 53, at 255.
See Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1972) (Aldisert, J.) (a judicial
opinion in which the court avoided unnecessary consideration of whether a products
liability case sounded in tort or contract).
65. De Foor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); Casey v. Manson Constr. &
Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Lilienthal v. Kaufmann, 239 Ore. 1, 395
P.2d 543 (1964).
66. In De Foor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968), all of the parties to the
wrongful death action were Oregon domiciliaries and the court imposed Oregon's ceiling
on damages. Obviously, Ryan presents a more difficult choice-of-law problem.
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through interest analysis if the forum is properly sensitive to the
potential effect of each state's dispositive and indicative laws. And, if
the forum is one determined to retain lex loci delicti, it, too, should
develop at least that degree of sensitivity to each state's dispositive
and indicative laws necessary to avoid an inept and possibly unconsti-
tutional resolution of a choice-of-law problem. There is, then, the
potential in interest analysis, when rationally utilized, of improving
choice-of-law solutions by courts embracing the methodology and of
avoiding wholly inept and unconstitutional solutions to choice-of-law
problems by courts determined to retain lex loci delicti.
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